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Abstract
Neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples and researchers have proposed many
heuristic attack and defense mechanisms. We address this problem through the principled lens
of distributionally robust optimization, which guarantees performance under adversarial input
perturbations. By considering a Lagrangian penalty formulation of perturbing the underlying
data distribution in a Wasserstein ball, we provide a training procedure that augments model
parameter updates with worst-case perturbations of training data. For smooth losses, our pro-
cedure provably achieves moderate levels of robustness with little computational or statistical
cost relative to empirical risk minimization. Furthermore, our statistical guarantees allow us
to efficiently certify robustness for the population loss. For imperceptible perturbations, our
method matches or outperforms heuristic approaches.
1 Introduction
Consider the classical supervised learning problem, in which we minimize an expected loss EP0 [ℓ(θ;Z)]
over a parameter θ ∈ Θ, where Z ∼ P0, P0 is a distribution on a space Z, and ℓ is a loss function.
In many systems, robustness to changes in the data-generating distribution P0 is desirable, whether
they be from covariate shifts, changes in the underlying domain [3], or adversarial attacks [24, 31].
As deep networks become prevalent in modern performance-critical systems (perception for self-
driving cars, automated detection of tumors), model failure is increasingly costly; in these situations,
it is irresponsible to deploy models whose robustness and failure modes we do not understand or
cannot certify.
Recent work shows that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples; seemingly
imperceptible perturbations to data can lead to misbehavior of the model, such as misclassification
of the output [24, 42, 31, 38]. Consequently, researchers have proposed adversarial attack and
defense mechanisms [43, 44, 45, 50, 14, 25, 35, 54]. These works provide an initial foundation for
adversarial training, but it is challenging to rigorously identify the classes of attacks against which
they can defend (or if they exist). Alternative approaches that provide formal verification of deep
networks [26, 28, 29] are NP-hard in general; they require prohibitive computational expense even on
small networks. Recently, researchers have proposed convex relaxations of the NP-hard verification
problem with some success [30, 47], though they may be difficult to scale to large networks. In this
context, our work is situated between these agendas: we develop efficient procedures with rigorous
guarantees for small to moderate amounts of robustness.
We take the perspective of distributionally robust optimization and provide an adversarial
training procedure with provable guarantees on its computational and statistical performance. We
*Equal contribution
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postulate a class P of distributions around the data-generating distribution P0 and consider the
problem
minimize
θ∈Θ
sup
P∈P
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]. (1)
The choice of P influences robustness guarantees and computability; we develop robustness sets
P with computationally efficient relaxations that apply even when the loss ℓ is non-convex. We
provide an adversarial training procedure that, for smooth ℓ, enjoys convergence guarantees similar
to non-robust approaches while certifying performance even for the worst-case population loss
supP∈P EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]. On a simple implementation in Tensorflow, our method takes 5–10× as long as
stochastic gradient methods for empirical risk minimization (ERM), matching runtimes for other
adversarial training procedures [24, 31, 35]. We show that our procedure—which learns to protect
against adversarial perturbations in the training dataset—generalizes, allowing us to train a model
that prevents attacks to the test dataset.
We briefly overview our approach. Let c : Z × Z → R+ ∪ {∞}, where c(z, z0) is the “cost” for
an adversary to perturb z0 to z (we typically use c(z, z0) = ‖z − z0‖2p with p ≥ 1). We consider
the robustness region P = {P : Wc(P,P0) ≤ ρ}, a ρ-neighborhood of the distribution P0 under the
Wasserstein metric Wc(·, ·) (see Section 2 for a formal definition). For deep networks and other
complex models, this formulation of problem (1) is intractable with arbitrary ρ. Instead, we consider
its Lagrangian relaxation for a fixed penalty parameter γ ≥ 0, resulting in the reformulation
minimize
θ∈Θ
{
F (θ) := sup
P
{EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(P,P0)} = EP0 [φγ(θ;Z)]
}
(2a)
where φγ(θ; z0) := sup
z∈Z
{ℓ(θ; z)− γc(z, z0)} . (2b)
(See Proposition 1 for a rigorous statement of these equalities.) Here, we have replaced the usual
loss ℓ(θ;Z) by the robust surrogate φγ(θ;Z); this surrogate (2b) allows adversarial perturbations
of the data z, modulated by the penalty γ. We typically solve the penalty problem (2) with P0
replaced by the empirical distribution P̂n, as P0 is unknown (we refer to this as the penalty problem
below).
The key feature of the penalty problem (2) is that moderate levels of robustness—in particular,
defense against imperceptible adversarial perturbations—are achievable at essentially no computa-
tional or statistical cost for smooth losses ℓ. Specifically, for large enough penalty γ (by duality,
small enough robustness ρ), the function z 7→ ℓ(θ; z) − γc(z, z0) in the robust surrogate (2b) is
strongly concave and hence easy to optimize if ℓ(θ, z) is smooth in z. Consequently, stochastic
gradient methods applied to problem (2) have similar convergence guarantees as for non-robust
methods (ERM). In Section 3, we provide a certificate of robustness for any ρ; we give an efficiently
computable data-dependent upper bound on the worst-case loss supP :Wc(P,P0)≤ρ EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]. That
is, the worst-case performance of the output of our principled adversarial training procedure is
guaranteed to be no worse than this certificate. Our bound is tight when ρ = ρ̂n, the achieved
robustness for the empirical objective. These results suggest advantages of networks with smooth
activations rather than ReLU’s. We experimentally verify our results in Section 4 and show that
we match or achieve state-of-the-art performance on a variety of adversarial attacks.
Robust optimization and adversarial training The standard robust-optimization approach
minimizes losses of the form supu∈U ℓ(θ; z+u) for some uncertainty set U [48, 4, 57]. Unfortunately,
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this approach is intractable except for specially structured losses, such as the composition of a linear
and simple convex function [4, 57, 58]. Nevertheless, this robust approach underlies recent advances
in adversarial training [52, 24, 44, 14, 35], which heuristically perturb data during a stochastic
optimization procedure.
One such heuristic uses a locally linearized loss function (proposed with p = ∞ as the “fast
gradient sign method” [24]):
∆xi(θ) := argmax
‖η‖p≤ǫ
{∇xℓ(θ; (xi, yi))T η} and perturb xi → xi +∆xi(θ). (3)
One form of adversarial training trains on the losses ℓ(θ; (xi + ∆xi(θ), yi)) [24, 31], while others
perform iterated variants [44, 14, 35, 54]. Madry et al. [35] observe that these procedures attempt to
optimize the objective EP0 [sup‖u‖p≤ǫ ℓ(θ;Z + u)], a constrained version of the penalty problem (2).
This notion of robustness is typically intractable: the inner supremum is generally non-concave in
u, so it is unclear whether model-fitting with these techniques converges, and there are possibly
worst-case perturbations these techniques do not find. Indeed, it is NP-hard to find worst-case
perturbations when deep networks use ReLU activations, suggesting difficulties for fast and iterated
heuristics (see Lemma 2 in Appendix B). Smoothness, which can be obtained in standard deep
architectures with exponential linear units (ELU’s) [17], allows us to find Lagrangian worst-case
perturbations with low computational cost.
Distributionally robust optimization To situate the current work, we review some of the
substantial body of work on robustness and learning. The choice of P in the robust objective (1)
affects both the richness of the uncertainty set we wish to consider as well as the tractability of
the resulting optimization problem. Previous approaches to distributional robustness have con-
sidered finite-dimensional parametrizations for P, such as constraint sets for moments, support,
or directional deviations [15, 18, 23], as well as non-parametric distances for probability measures
such as f -divergences [5, 6, 32, 36, 19, 39], and Wasserstein distances [21, 51, 9]. In constrast to
f -divergences (e.g. χ2- or Kullback-Leibler divergences) which are effective when the support of
the distribution P0 is fixed, a Wasserstein ball around P0 includes distributions Q with different
support and allows (in a sense) robustness to unseen data.
Many authors have studied tractable classes of uncertainty sets P and losses ℓ. For example,
Ben-Tal et al. [5] and Namkoong and Duchi [40] use convex optimization approaches for f -divergence
balls. For worst-case regions P formed by Wasserstein balls, Esfahani and Kuhn [21], Shafieezadeh-
Abadeh et al. [51], and Blanchet et al. [9] show how to convert the saddle-point problem (1) to a
regularized ERM problem, but this is possible only for a limited class of convex losses ℓ and costs c.
In this work, we treat a much larger class of losses and costs and provide direct solution methods
for a Lagrangian relaxation of the saddle-point problem (1). One natural application area is in
domain adaptation [33]; concurrently with this work, Lee and Raginsky provide guarantees simi-
lar to ours for the empirical minimizer of the robust saddle-point problem (1) and give specialized
bounds for domain adaptation problems. In contrast, our approach is to use the distributionally ro-
bust approach to both defend against imperceptible adversarial perturbations and develop efficient
optimization procedures.
3
2 Proposed approach
Our approach is based on the following simple insight: assume that the function z 7→ ℓ(θ; z) is
smooth, meaning there is some L for which ∇zℓ(θ; ·) is L-Lipschitz. Then for any c : Z × Z →
R+ ∪ {∞} 1-strongly convex in its first argument, a Taylor expansion yields
ℓ(θ; z′)− γc(z′, z0) ≤ ℓ(θ; z)− γc(z, z0) +
〈∇z(ℓ(θ; z)− γc(z, z0)), z′ − z〉+ L− γ
2
∥∥z − z′∥∥2
2
. (4)
For γ ≥ L this is the first-order condition for (γ − L)-strong concavity of z 7→ (ℓ(θ; z)− γc(z, z0)).
Thus, whenever the loss is smooth enough in z and the penalty γ is large enough (corresponding
to less robustness), computing the surrogate (2b) is a strongly-concave optimization problem.
We leverage the insight (4) to show that as long as we do not require too much robustness,
this strong concavity approach (4) provides a computationally efficient and principled approach for
robust optimization problems (1). Our starting point is a duality result for the minimax problem (1)
and its Lagrangian relaxation for Wasserstein-based uncertainty sets, which makes the connections
between distributional robustness and the “lazy” surrogate (2b) clear. We then show (Section 2.1)
how stochastic gradient descent methods can efficiently find minimizers (in the convex case) or
approximate stationary points (when ℓ is non-convex) for our relaxed robust problems.
Wasserstein robustness and duality Wasserstein distances define a notion of closeness be-
tween distributions. Let Z ⊂ Rm, and let (Z,A, P0) be a probability space. Let the transporta-
tion cost c : Z × Z → [0,∞) be nonnegative, lower semi-continuous, and satisfy c(z, z) = 0.
For example, for a differentiable convex h : Z → R, the Bregman divergence c(z, z0) = h(z) −
h(z0) − 〈∇h(z0), z − z0〉 satisfies these conditions. For probability measures P and Q supported
on Z, let Π(P,Q) denote their couplings, meaning measures M on Z2 with M(A,Z) = P (A) and
M(Z, A) = Q(A). The Wasserstein distance between P and Q is
Wc(P,Q) := inf
M∈Π(P,Q)
EM [c(Z,Z
′)].
For ρ ≥ 0 and distribution P0, we let P = {P : Wc(P,P0) ≤ ρ}, considering the Wasserstein form
of the robust problem (1) and its Lagrangian relaxation (2) with γ ≥ 0. The following duality
result [8] gives the equality (2) for the relaxation and an analogous result for the problem (1). We
give an alternative proof in Appendix C.1 for convex, continuous cost functions.
Proposition 1. Let ℓ : Θ × Z → R and c : Z × Z → R+ be continuous. Let φγ(θ; z0) =
supz∈Z {ℓ(θ; z)− γc(z, z0)} be the robust surrogate (2b). For any distribution Q and any ρ > 0,
sup
P :Wc(P,Q)≤ρ
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] = inf
γ≥0
{
γρ+ EQ[φγ(θ;Z)]
}
, (5)
and for any γ ≥ 0, we have
sup
P
{EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(P,Q)} = EQ[φγ(θ;Z)]. (6)
Leveraging the insight (4), we give up the requirement that we wish a prescribed amount ρ of
robustness (solving the worst-case problem (1) for P = {P : Wc(P,P0) ≤ ρ}) and focus instead on
the Lagrangian penalty problem (2) and its empirical counterpart
minimize
θ∈Θ
{
Fn(θ) := sup
P
{
E[ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(P, P̂n)
}
= E
P̂n
[φγ(θ;Z)]
}
. (7)
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2.1 Optimizing the robust loss by stochastic gradient descent
We now develop stochastic gradient-type methods for the relaxed robust problem (7), making
clear the computational benefits of relaxing the strict robustness requirements of formulation (5).
We begin with assumptions we require, which roughly quantify the amount of robustness we can
provide.
Assumption A. The function c : Z×Z → R+ is continuous. For each z0 ∈ Z, c(·, z0) is 1-strongly
convex with respect to the norm ‖·‖.
To guarantee that the robust surrogate (2b) is tractably computable, we also require a few smooth-
ness assumptions. Let ‖·‖∗ be the dual norm to ‖·‖; we abuse notation by using the same norm ‖·‖
on Θ and Z, though the specific norm is clear from context.
Assumption B. The loss ℓ : Θ×Z → R satisfies the Lipschitzian smoothness conditions∥∥∇θℓ(θ; z)−∇θℓ(θ′; z)∥∥∗ ≤ Lθθ ∥∥θ − θ′∥∥ , ∥∥∇zℓ(θ; z)−∇zℓ(θ; z′)∥∥∗ ≤ Lzz ∥∥z − z′∥∥ ,∥∥∇θℓ(θ; z)−∇θℓ(θ; z′)∥∥∗ ≤ Lθz ∥∥z − z′∥∥ , ∥∥∇zℓ(θ; z)−∇zℓ(θ′; z)∥∥∗ ≤ Lzθ ∥∥θ − θ′∥∥ .
These properties guarantee both (i) the well-behavedness of the robust surrogate φγ and (ii) its
efficient computability. Making point (i) precise, Lemma 1 shows that if γ is large enough and
Assumption B holds, the surrogate φγ is still smooth. Throughout, we assume Θ ⊆ Rd.
Lemma 1. Let f : Θ × Z → R be differentiable and λ-strongly concave in z with respect to the
norm ‖·‖, and define f¯(θ) = supz∈Z f(θ, z). Let gθ(θ, z) = ∇θf(θ, z) and gz(θ, z) = ∇zf(θ, z), and
assume gθ and gz satisfy Assumption B with ℓ(θ; z) replaced with f(θ, z). Then f¯ is differentiable,
and letting z⋆(θ) = argmaxz∈Z f(θ, z), we have ∇f¯(θ) = gθ(θ, z⋆(θ)). Moreover,
‖z⋆(θ1)− z⋆(θ2)‖ ≤ Lzθ
λ
‖θ1 − θ2‖ and
∥∥∇f¯(θ)−∇f¯(θ′)∥∥
⋆
≤
(
Lθθ +
LθzLzθ
λ
)∥∥θ − θ′∥∥ .
See Section C.2 for the proof. Fix z0 ∈ Z and focus on the ℓ2-norm case where c(z, z0) satisfies
Assumption A with ‖·‖2. Noting that f(θ, z) := ℓ(θ, z) − γc(z, z0) is (γ − Lzz)-strongly concave
from the insight (4) (with L := Lzz), let us apply Lemma 1. Under Assumptions A, B, φγ(·; z0)
then has L = Lθθ +
LθzLzθ
[γ−Lzz]+
-Lipschitz gradients, and
∇θφγ(θ; z0) = ∇θℓ(θ; z⋆(z0, θ)) where z⋆(z0, θ) = argmax
z∈Z
{ℓ(θ; z)− γc(z, z0)}.
This motivates Algorithm 1, a stochastic-gradient approach for the penalty problem (7). The
benefits of Lagrangian relaxation become clear here: for ℓ(θ; z) smooth in z and γ large enough,
gradient ascent on ℓ(θt; z)− γc(z, zt) in z converges linearly and we can compute (approximate) ẑt
efficiently (we initialize our inner gradient ascent iterations with the sampled natural example zt).
Convergence properties of Algorithm 1 depend on the loss ℓ. When ℓ is convex in θ and γ is
large enough that z 7→ (ℓ(θ; z) − γc(z, z0)) is concave for all (θ, z0) ∈ Θ × Z, we have a stochastic
monotone variational inequality, which is efficiently solvable [27, 16] with convergence rate 1/
√
T .
When the loss ℓ is nonconvex in θ, the following theorem guarantees convergence to a stationary
point of problem (7) at the same rate when γ ≥ Lzz. Recall that F (θ) = EP0 [φγ(θ;Z)] is the robust
surrogate objective for the Lagrangian relaxation (2).
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Algorithm 1 Distributionally robust optimization with adversarial training
Input: Sampling distribution P0, constraint sets Θ and Z, stepsize sequence {αt > 0}T−1t=0
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do
Sample zt ∼ P0 and find an ǫ-approximate maximizer ẑt of ℓ(θt; z)− γc(z, zt)
θt+1 ← ProjΘ(θt − αt∇θℓ(θt; ẑt))
Theorem 2 (Convergence of Nonconvex SGD). Let Assumptions A and B hold with the ℓ2-norm
and let Θ = Rd. Let ∆F ≥ F (θ0) − infθ F (θ). Assume E[‖∇F (θ)−∇θφγ(θ, Z)‖22] ≤ σ2, and take
constant stepsizes α =
√
2∆F
Lφσ2T
where Lφ := Lθθ +
LθzLzθ
γ−Lzz
. Then Algorithm 1 satisfies
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
[∥∥∇F (θt)∥∥2
2
]
− 2L
2
θz
γ − Lzz ǫ ≤ σ
√
8
Lφ∆F
T
.
See Section C.3 for the proof. We make a few remarks. First, the condition E[‖∇F (θ)−∇θφγ(θ, Z)‖22] ≤
σ2 holds (to within a constant factor) whenever ‖∇θℓ(θ, z)‖2 ≤ σ for all θ, z. Theorem 2 shows
that the stochastic gradient method achieves the rates of convergence on the penalty problem (7)
achievable in standard smooth non-convex optimization [22]. The accuracy parameter ǫ has a fixed
effect on optimization accuracy, independent of T : approximate maximization has limited effects.
Key to the convergence guarantee of Theorem 2 is that the loss ℓ is smooth in z: the inner
supremum (2b) is NP-hard to compute for non-smooth deep networks (see Lemma 2 in Section B
for a proof of this for ReLU’s). The smoothness of ℓ is essential so that a penalized version ℓ(θ, z)−
γc(z, z0) is concave in z (which can be approximately verified by computing Hessians ∇2zzℓ(θ, z) for
each training datapoint), allowing computation and our coming certificates of optimality. Replacing
ReLU’s with sigmoids or ELU’s [17] allows us to apply Theorem 2, making distributionally robust
optimization tractable for deep learning.
In supervised-learning scenarios, we are often interested in adversarial perturbations only to
feature vectors (and not labels). Letting Z = (X,Y ) whereX denotes the feature vector (covariates)
and Y the label, this is equivalent to defining the Wasserstein cost function c : Z ×Z → R+ ∪{∞}
by
c(z, z′) := cx(x, x
′) +∞ · 1{y 6= y′} (8)
where cx : X × X → R+ is the transportation cost for the feature vector X. All of our results
suitably generalize to this setting with minor modifications to the robust surrogate (2b) and the
above assumptions (see Section D). Similarly, our distributionally robust framework (2) is general
enough to consider adversarial perturbations to only an arbitrary subset of coordinates in Z. For
example, it may be appropriate in certain applications to hedge against adversarial perturbations
to a small fixed region of an image [13]. By suitably modifying the cost function c(z, z′) to take
value ∞ outside this small region, our general formulation covers such variants.
3 Certificate of robustness and generalization
From results in the previous section, Algorithm 1 provably learns to protect against adversarial
perturbations of the form (7) on the training dataset. Now we show that such procedures generalize,
allowing us to prevent attacks on the test set. Our subsequent results hold uniformly over the space
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of parameters θ ∈ Θ, including θWRM, the output of the stochastic gradient descent procedure in
Section 2.1. Our first main result, presented in Section 3.1, gives a data-dependent upper bound on
the population worst-case objective supP :Wc(P,P0)≤ρ EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] for any arbitrary level of robustness
ρ; this bound is optimal for ρ = ρ̂n, the level of robustness achieved for the empirical distribution
by solving (7). Our bound is efficiently computable and hence certifies a level of robustness for
the worst-case population objective. Second, we show in Section 3.2 that adversarial perturbations
on the training set (in a sense) generalize: solving the empirical penalty problem (7) guarantees a
similar level of robustness as directly solving its population counterpart (2).
3.1 Certificate of robustness
Our main result in this section is a data-dependent upper bound for the worst-case population
objective: supP :Wc(P,P0)≤ρ EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] ≤ γρ + EP̂n [φγ(θ;Z)] + O(1/
√
n) for all θ ∈ Θ, with high
probability. To make this rigorous, fix γ > 0, and consider the worst-case perturbation, typically
called the transportation map or Monge map [56],
Tγ(θ; z0) := argmax
z∈Z
{ℓ(θ; z)− γc(z, z0)}. (9)
Under our assumptions, Tγ is easily computable when γ ≥ Lzz. Letting δz denote the point mass
at z, Proposition 1 shows the empirical maximizers of the Lagrangian formulation (6) are attained
by
P ∗n(θ) := argmax
P
{
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(P, P̂n)
}
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δTγ(θ,Zi) and
ρ̂n(θ) := Wc(P
∗
n(θ), P̂n) = EP̂n [c(Tγ(θ;Z), Z)].
(10)
Our results imply, in particular, that the empirical worst-case loss EP ∗n [ℓ(θ;Z)] gives a certificate
of robustness to (population) Wasserstein perturbations up to level ρ̂n. EP ∗n(θ)[ℓ(θ;Z)] is efficiently
computable via (10), providing a data-dependent guarantee for the worst-case population loss.
Our bound relies on the usual covering numbers for the model class {ℓ(θ; ·) : θ ∈ Θ} as the
notion of complexity [e.g. 55], so, despite the infinite-dimensional problem (7), we retain the same
uniform convergence guarantees typical of empirical risk minimization. Recall that for a set V ,
a collection v1, . . . , vN is an ǫ-cover of V in norm ‖·‖ if for each v ∈ V, there exists vi such that
‖v − vi‖ ≤ ǫ. The covering number of V with respect to ‖·‖ is
N(V, ǫ, ‖·‖) := inf {N ∈ N | there is an ǫ-cover of V with respect to ‖·‖} .
For F := {ℓ(θ, ·) : θ ∈ Θ} equipped with the L∞(Z) norm ‖f‖L∞(Z) := supz∈Z |f(z)|, we state our
results in terms of ‖·‖L∞(Z)-covering numbers of F . To ease notation, we let
ǫn(t) := γb1
√
Mℓ
n
∫ 1
0
√
logN(F ,Mℓǫ, ‖·‖L∞(Z))dǫ+ b2Mℓ
√
t
n
where b1, b2 are numerical constants.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section. We first show from the duality
result (6) that we can provide an upper bound for the worst-case population performance for any
level of robustness ρ. For ρ = ρ̂n(θ) and θ = θWRM, this certificate is (in a sense) tight as we see
below.
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Theorem 3. Assume |ℓ(θ; z)| ≤Mℓ for all θ ∈ Θ and z ∈ Z. Then, for a fixed t > 0 and numerical
constants b1, b2 > 0, with probability at least 1− e−t, simultaneously for all θ ∈ Θ, ρ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0,
sup
P :Wc(P,P0)≤ρ
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] ≤ γρ+ EP̂n [φγ(θ;Z)] + ǫn(t). (11)
In particular, if ρ = ρ̂n(θ) then with probability at least 1− e−t, for all θ ∈ Θ
sup
P :Wc(P,P0)≤ρ̂n(θ)
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] ≤ γρ̂n(θ) + EP̂n [φγ(θ;Z)] + ǫn(t)
= sup
P :Wc(P,P̂n)≤ρ̂n(θ)
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] + ǫn(t). (12)
See Section C.4 for its proof. We now give a concrete variant of Theorem 3 for Lipschitz functions.
When Θ is finite-dimensional (Θ ⊂ Rd), Theorem 3 provides a robustness guarantee scaling linearly
with d despite the infinite-dimensional Wasserstein penalty. Assuming there exist θ0 ∈ Θ,Mθ0 <∞
such that |ℓ(θ0; z)| ≤Mθ0 for all z ∈ Z, we have the following corollary (see proof in Section C.5).
Corollary 1. Let ℓ(·; z) be L-Lipschitz with respect to some norm ‖·‖ for all z ∈ Z. Assume that
Θ ⊂ Rd satisfies diam(Θ) = supθ,θ′∈Θ ‖θ − θ′‖ <∞. Then, the bounds (11) and (12) hold with
ǫn(t) = b1
√
d(L diam(Θ) +Mθ0)
n
+ b2(L diam(Θ) +Mθ0)
√
t
n
(13)
for some numerical constants b1, b2 > 0.
A key consequence of the bound (11) is that γρ + EP̂n[φγ(θ;Z)] certifies robustness for the
worst-case population objective for any ρ and θ. For a given θ, this certificate is tightest at the
achieved level of robustness ρ̂n(θ), as noted in the refined bound (12) which follows from the duality
result
EP̂n
[φγ(θ;Z)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
surrogate loss
+ γρ̂n(θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
robustness
= sup
P :Wc(P,P̂n)≤ρ̂n(θ)
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] = EP ∗n(θ)[ℓ(θ;Z)]. (14)
(See Section C.4 for a proof of these equalities.) We expect θWRM, the output of Algorithm 1, to be
close to the minimizer of the surrogate loss EP̂n [φγ(θ;Z)] and therefore have the best guarantees.
Most importantly, the certificate (14) is easy to compute via expression (10): as noted in Section 2.1,
the mappings T (θ, Zi) are efficiently computable for large enough γ, and ρ̂n = EP̂n [c(T (θ, Z), Z)].
The bounds (11)–(13) may be too large—because of their dependence on covering numbers and
dimension—for practical use in security-critical applications. With that said, the strong duality
result, Proposition 1, still applies to any distribution. In particular, given a collection of test
examples Ztesti , we may interrogate possible losses under perturbations for the test examples by
noting that, if P̂test denotes the empirical distribution on the test set (say, with putative assigned
labels), then
1
ntest
n∑
i=1
sup
z:c(z,Ztesti )≤ρ
{ℓ(θ; z)} ≤ sup
P :Wc(P,P̂test)≤ρ
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] ≤ γρ+ EP̂test [φγ(θ;Z)] (15)
for all γ, ρ ≥ 0. Whenever γ is large enough (so that this is tight for small ρ), we may efficiently
compute the Monge-map (9) and the test loss (15) to guarantee bounds on the sensitivity of a
parameter θ to a particular sample and predicted labeling based on the sample.
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3.2 Generalization of Adversarial Examples
We can also show that the level of robustness on the training set generalizes. Our starting point is
Lemma 1, which shows that Tγ(·; z) is smooth under Assumptions A and B:
‖Tγ(θ1; z)− Tγ(θ2; z)‖ ≤ Lzθ
[γ − Lzz]+
‖θ1 − θ2‖ (16)
for all θ1, θ2, where we recall that Lzz is the Lipschitz constant of ∇zℓ(θ; z). Leveraging this
smoothness, we show that ρ̂n(θ) = EP̂n [c(Tγ(θ;Z), Z)], the level of robustness achieved for the
empirical problem, concentrates uniformly around its population counterpart.
Theorem 4. Let Z ⊂ {z ∈ Rm : ‖z‖ ≤ Mz} so that ‖Z‖ ≤ Mz almost surely and assume either
that (i) c(·, ·) is Lc-Lipschitz over Z with respect to the norm ‖·‖ in each argument, or (ii) that
ℓ(θ, z) ∈ [0,Mℓ] and z 7→ ℓ(θ, z) is γLc-Lipschitz for all θ ∈ Θ.
If Assumptions A and B hold, then with probability at least 1− e−t,
sup
θ∈Θ
|EP̂n [c(Tγ(θ;Z), Z)]− EP0 [c(Tγ(θ;Z), Z)]| ≤ 4B
√
1
n
(
t+ logN
(
Θ,
[γ − Lzz]+ t
4LcLzθ
, ‖·‖
))
. (17)
where B = LcMz under assumption (i) and B =Mℓ/γ under assumption (ii).
See Section C.6 for the proof. For Θ ⊂ Rd, we have logN(Θ, ǫ, ‖·‖) ≤ d log(1 + diam(Θ)ǫ ) so that
the bound (30) gives the usual
√
d/n generalization rate for the distance between adversarial
perturbations and natural examples. Another consequence of Theorem 4 is that ρ̂n(θWRM) in the
certificate (12) is positive as long as the loss ℓ is not completely invariant to data. To see this, note
from the optimality conditions for Tγ(θ;Z) that EP0 [c(Tγ(θ;Z), Z)] = 0 iff ∇zℓ(θ; z) = 0 almost
surely, and hence for large enough n, we have ρ̂n(θ) > 0 by the bound (30).
4 Experiments
Our technique for distributionally robust optimization with adversarial training extends beyond
supervised learning. To that end, we present empirical evaluations on supervised and reinforcement
learning tasks where we compare performance with empirical risk minimization (ERM) and, where
appropriate, models trained with the fast-gradient method (3) (FGM) [24], its iterated variant
(IFGM) [31], and the projected-gradient method (PGM) [35]. PGM augments stochastic gradient
steps for the parameter θ with projected gradient ascent over x 7→ ℓ(θ;x, y), iterating (for data
point xi, yi)
∆xt+1i (θ) := argmax
‖η‖p≤ǫ
{∇xℓ(θ;xti, yi)T η} and xt+1i := ΠBǫ,p(xti)
{
xti + αt∆x
t
i(θ)
}
(18)
for t = 1, . . . , Tadv, where Π denotes projection onto Bǫ,p(xi) := {x : ‖x− xi‖p ≤ ǫ}.
The adversarial training literature (e.g. Goodfellow et al. [24]) usually considers ‖·‖∞-norm
attacks, which allow imperceptible perturbations to all input features. In most scenarios, however,
it is reasonable to defend against weaker adversaries that instead perturb influential features more.
We consider this setting and train against ‖·‖2-norm attacks. Namely, we use the squared Euclidean
cost for the feature vectors cx(x, x
′) := ‖x− x′‖22 and define the overall cost as the covariate-shift
adversary (8) for WRM (Algorithm 1), and we use p = 2 for FGM, IFGM, PGM training in all
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experiments; we still test against adversarial perturbations with respect to the norms p = 2,∞.
We use Tadv = 15 iterations for all iterative methods (IFGM, PGM, and WRM) in training and
attacks.
In Section 4.1, we visualize differences between our approach and ad-hoc methods to illustrate
the benefits of certified robustness. In Section 4.2 we consider a supervised learning problem for
MNIST where we adversarially perturb the test data. Finally, we consider a reinforcement learning
problem in Section 4.3, where the Markov decision process used for training differs from that for
testing.
WRM enjoys the theoretical guarantees of Sections 2 and 3 for large γ, but for small γ (large
adversarial budgets), WRM becomes a heuristic like other methods. In Appendix A.4, we com-
pare WRM with other methods on attacks with large adversarial budgets. In Appendix A.5, we
further compare WRM—which is trained to defend against ‖·‖2-adversaries—with other heuristics
trained to defend against ‖·‖∞-adversaries. WRM matches or outperforms other heuristics against
imperceptible attacks, while it underperforms for attacks with large adversarial budgets.
4.1 Visualizing the benefits of certified robustness
For our first experiment, we generate synthetic data Z = (X,Y ) ∼ P0 by Xi iid∼ N(02, I2) with
labels Yi = sign(‖x‖2 −
√
2), where X ∈ R2 and I2 is the identity matrix in R2. Furthermore, to
create a wide margin separating the classes, we remove data with ‖X‖2 ∈ (
√
2/1.3, 1.3
√
2). We
train a small neural network with 2 hidden layers of size 4 and 2 and either all ReLU or all ELU
activations between layers, comparing our approach (WRM) with ERM and the 2-norm FGM. For
our approach we use γ = 2, and to make fair comparisons with FGM we use
ǫ2 = ρ̂n(θWRM) =Wc(P
∗
n(θWRM), P̂n) = EP̂n [c(T (θWRM, Z), Z)], (19)
for the fast-gradient perturbation magnitude ǫ, where θWRM is the output of Algorithm 1.
1
Figure 1 illustrates the classification boundaries for the three training procedures over the ReLU-
activated (Figure 1(a)) and ELU-activated (Figure 1(b)) models. Since 70% of the data are of the
blue class (‖X‖2 ≤
√
2/1.3), distributional robustness favors pushing the classification boundary
outwards; intuitively, adversarial examples are most likely to come from pushing blue points out-
wards across the boundary. ERM and FGM suffer from sensitivities to various regions of the data,
as evidenced by the lack of symmetry in their classification boundaries. For both activations, WRM
pushes the classification boundaries further outwards than ERM or FGM. However, WRM with
ReLU’s still suffers from sensitivities (e.g. radial asymmetry in the classification surface) due to
the lack of robustness guarantees. WRM with ELU’s provides a certified level of robustness, yield-
ing an axisymmetric classification boundary that hedges against adversarial perturbations in all
directions.
Recall that our certificates of robustness on the worst-case performance given in Theorem 3
applies for any level of robustness ρ. In Figure 2(a), we plot our certificate (11) against the out-
of-sample (test) worst-case performance supP :Wc(P,P0)≤ρ EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] for WRM with ELU’s. Since
the worst-case loss is hard to evaluate directly, we solve its Lagrangian relaxation (6) for different
values of γadv. For each γadv, we consider the distance to adversarial examples in the test dataset
ρ̂test(θ) := EP̂test [c(Tγadv (θ, Z), Z)], (20)
1For ELU activations with scale parameter 1, γ = 2 makes problem (2b) strongly concave over the training data.
ReLU’s have no guarantees, but we use 15 gradient steps with stepsize 1/
√
t for both activations.
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(a) ReLU model (b) ELU model
Figure 1. Experimental results on synthetic data. Training data are shown in blue and red.
Classification boundaries are shown in yellow, purple, and green for ERM, FGM, and and WRM
respectively. The boundaries are shown with the training data as well as separately with the true
class boundaries.
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(b) MNIST
Figure 2. Empirical comparison between certificate of robustness (11) (blue) and test worst-case
performance (red) for experiments with (a) synthetic data and (b) MNIST. We omit the certificate’s
error term ǫn(t). The vertical bar indicates the achieved level of robustness on the training set
ρ̂n(θWRM).
where P̂test is the test distribution, c(z, z
′) := ‖x−x′‖22+∞·1 {y 6= y′} as before, and Tγadv(θ, Z) =
argmaxz{ℓ(θ; z) − γadvc(z, Z)} is the adversarial perturbation of Z (Monge map) for the model θ.
The worst-case losses on the test dataset are then given by
E
P̂test
[φγadv(θWRM;Z)] + γadvρ̂test(θWRM) = sup
P :Wc(P,Ptest)≤ρ̂test(θWRM)
EP [ℓ(θWRM;Z)].
As anticipated, our certificate is almost tight near the achieved level of robustness ρ̂n(θWRM) for
WRM (10) and provides a performance guarantee even for other values of ρ.
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4.2 Learning a more robust classifier
We now consider a standard benchmark—training a neural network classifier on the MNIST dataset.
The network consists of 8 × 8, 6 × 6, and 5 × 5 convolutional filter layers with ELU activations
followed by a fully connected layer and softmax output. We train WRM with γ = 0.04EP̂n [‖X‖2],
and for the other methods we choose ǫ as the level of robustness achieved by WRM (19).2 In the
figures, we scale the budgets 1/γadv and ǫadv for the adversary with Cp := EP̂n [‖X‖p].3
First, in Figure 2(b) we again illustrate the validity of our certificate of robustness (11) for the
worst-case test performance for arbitrary level of robustness ρ. We see that our certificate provides
a performance guarantee for out-of-sample worst-case performance.
We now compare adversarial training techniques. All methods achieve at least 99% test-set
accuracy, implying there is little test-time penalty for the robustness levels (ǫ and γ) used for
training. It is thus important to distinguish the methods’ abilities to combat attacks. We test
performance of the five methods (ERM, FGM, IFGM, PGM, WRM) under PGM attacks (18)
with respect to 2- and ∞-norms. In Figure 3(a) and (b), all adversarial methods outperform
ERM, and WRM offers more robustness even with respect to these PGM attacks. Training with
the Euclidean cost still provides robustness to ∞-norm fast gradient attacks. We provide further
evidence in Appendix A.1.
Next we study stability of the loss surface with respect to perturbations to inputs. We note
that small values of ρ̂test(θ), the distance to adversarial examples (20), correspond to small mag-
nitudes of ∇zℓ(θ; z) in a neighborhood of the nominal input, which ensures stability of the model.
Figure 4(a) shows that ρ̂test differs by orders of magnitude between the training methods (mod-
els θ = θERM, θFGM, θIFGM, θPGM, θWRM); the trend is nearly uniform over all γadv, with θWRM
being the most stable. Thus, we see that our adversarial-training method defends against gradient-
exploiting attacks by reducing the magnitudes of gradients near the nominal input.
In Figure 4(b) we provide a qualitative picture by adversarially perturbing a single test data-
point until the model misclassifies it. Specifically, we again consider WRM attacks and we decrease
γadv until each model misclassifies the input. The original label is 8, whereas on the adversarial
examples IFGM predicts 2, PGM predicts 0, and the other models predict 3. WRM’s “misclassifi-
cations” appear consistently reasonable to the human eye (see Appendix A.2 for examples of other
digits); WRM defends against gradient-based exploits by learning a representation that makes gra-
dients point towards inputs of other classes. Together, Figures 4(a) and (b) depict our method’s
defense mechanisms to gradient-based attacks: creating a more stable loss surface by reducing the
magnitude of gradients and improving their interpretability.
4.3 Robust Markov decision processes
For our final experiments, we consider distributional robustness in the context of Q-learning, a
model-free reinforcement learning technique. We consider Markov decision processes (MDP’s)
(S,A, Psa, r) with state space S, action space A, state-action transition probabilities Psa, and
rewards r : S → R. The goal of a reinforcement-learning agent is to maximize (discounted) cumu-
lative rewards
∑
t λ
t
E[r(st)] (with discount factor λ); this is analogous to minimizing EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]
in supervised learning. Robust MDP’s consider an ambiguity set Psa for state-action transitions.
2For this γ, φγ(θWRM; z) is strongly concave for 98% of the training data.
3For the standard MNIST dataset, C2 := EP̂n ‖X‖2 = 9.21 and C∞ := EP̂n ‖X‖∞ = 1.00.
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(a) Test error vs. ǫadv for ‖ · ‖2 attack
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(b) Test error vs. ǫadv for ‖ · ‖∞ attack
Figure 3. PGM attacks on the MNIST dataset. (a) and (b) show test misclassification error vs.
the adversarial perturbation level ǫadv for the PGM attack with respect to Euclidean and ∞ norms
respectively. The vertical bar in (a) indicates the perturbation level used for training the PGM,
FGM, and IFGM models as well as the estimated radius
√
ρ̂n(θWRM). For MNIST, C2 = 9.21 and
C∞ = 1.00.
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100
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(a) ρ̂test vs. 1/γadv (b) Perturbations on a test datapoint
Figure 4. Stability of the loss surface. In (a), we show the average distance of the perturbed
distribution ρ̂test for a given γadv, an indicator of local stability to inputs for the decision surface.
The vertical bar in (a) indicates the γ we use for training WRM. In (b) we visualize the smallest
WRM perturbation (largest γadv) necessary to make a model misclassify a datapoint. More examples
are in Appendix A.2.
The goal is maximizing the worst-case realization infP∈Psa
∑
t λ
t
EP [r(s
t)], analogous to problem
(1).
In a standard MDP, Q-learning learns a quality function Q : S × A → R via the iterations
Q(st, at)← Q(st, at) + αt
(
r(st) + λmax
a
Q(st+1, a)−Q(st, at)
)
(21)
such that argmaxaQ(s, a) is (eventually) the optimal action in state s to maximize cumulative
reward. In scenarios where the underlying environment has a continuous state-space and we repre-
sent Q with a differentiable function (e.g. [37]), we can modify the update (21) with an adversarial
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state perturbation to incorporate distributional robustness. Namely, we draw the nominal state-
transition update ŝt+1 ∼ psa(st, at), and proceed with the update (21) using the perturbation
st+1 ← argmin
s
{
r(s) + λmax
a
Q(s, a) + γc(s, sˆt+1)
}
. (22)
For large γ, we can again solve problem (22) efficiently using gradient descent. This procedure
provides robustness to uncertainties in state-action transitions. For tabular Q-learning, where we
represent Q only over a discretized covering of the underlying state-space, we can either neglect
the second term in the update (22) and, after performing the update, round st+1 as usual, or
we can perform minimization directly over the discretized covering. In the former case, since the
update (22) simply modifies the state-action transitions (independent of Q), standard results on
convergence for tabular Q-learning (e.g. Szepesva´ri and Littman [53]) apply under these adversarial
dynamics.
We test our adversarial training procedure in the cart-pole environment, where the goal is to
balance a pole on a cart by moving the cart left or right. The environment caps episode lengths
to 400 steps and ends the episode prematurely if the pole falls too far from the vertical or the cart
translates too far from its origin. We use reward r(β) := e−|β| for the angle β of the pole from
the vertical. We use a tabular representation for Q with 30 discretized states for β and 15 for its
time-derivative β˙ (we perform the update (22) without the Q-dependent term). The action space
is binary: push the cart left or right with a fixed force. Due to the nonstationary, policy-dependent
radius for the Wasserstein ball, an analogous ǫ for the fast-gradient method (or other variants) is
not well-defined. Thus, we only compare with an agent trained on the nominal MDP. We test both
models with perturbations to the physical parameters: we shrink/magnify the pole’s mass by 2,
the pole’s length by 2, and the strength of gravity g by 5. The system’s dynamics are such that the
heavy, short, and strong-gravity cases are more unstable than the original environment, whereas
their counterparts are less unstable.
Table 1 shows the performance of the trained models over the original MDP and all of the
perturbed MDPs. Both models perform similarly over easier environments, but the robust model
greatly outperforms in harder environments. Interestingly, as shown in Figure 5, the robust model
also learns more efficiently than the nominal model in the original MDP. We hypothesize that a
potential side-effect of robustness is that adversarial perturbations encourage better exploration of
the environment.
5 Discussion and future work
Explicit distributional robustness of the form (5) is intractable except in limited cases. We provide
a principled method for efficiently guaranteeing distributional robustness with a simple form of
adversarial data perturbation. Using only assumptions about the smoothness of the loss function
ℓ, we prove that our method enjoys strong statistical guarantees and fast optimization rates for a
large class of problems. The NP-hardness of certifying robustness for ReLU networks, coupled with
our empirical success and theoretical certificates for smooth networks in deep learning, suggest that
using smooth networks may be preferable if we wish to guarantee robustness. Empirical evaluations
indicate that our methods are in fact robust to perturbations in the data, and they match or
outperform less-principled adversarial training techniques. The major benefit of our approach is
its simplicity and wide applicability across many models and machine-learning scenarios.
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Environment Regular Robust
Original 399.7 ± 0.1 400.0 ± 0.0
Easier environments
Light 400.0 ± 0.0 400.0 ± 0.0
Long 400.0 ± 0.0 400.0 ± 0.0
Soft g 400.0 ± 0.0 400.0 ± 0.0
Harder environments
Heavy 150.1 ± 4.7 334.0 ± 3.7
Short 245.2 ± 4.8 400.0 ± 0.0
Strong g 189.8 ± 2.3 398.5 ± 0.3
Table 1. Episode length over 1000 trials
(mean ± standard error)
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Figure 5. Episode lengths during training.
The environment caps episodes to 400 steps.
There remain many avenues for future investigation. Our optimization result (Theorem 2)
applies only for small values of robustness ρ and to a limited class of Wasserstein costs. Furthermore,
our statistical guarantees (Theorems 3 and 4) use ‖·‖∞-covering numbers as a measure of model
complexity, which can become prohibitively large for deep networks. In a learning-theoretic context,
where the goal is to provide insight into convergence behavior as well as comfort that a procedure
will “work” given enough data, such guarantees are satisfactory, but this may not be enough in
security-essential contexts. This problem currently persists for most learning-theoretic guarantees
in deep learning, and the recent works of Bartlett et al. [2], Dziugaite and Roy [20], and Neyshabur
et al. [41] attempt to mitigate this shortcoming. Replacing our current covering number arguments
with more intricate notions such as margin-based bounds [2] would extend the scope and usefulness
of our theoretical guarantees. Of course, the certificate (15) still holds regardless.
More broadly, this work focuses on small-perturbation attacks, and our theoretical guarantees
show that it is possible to efficiently build models that provably guard against such attacks. Our
method becomes another heuristic for protection against attacks with large adversarial budgets.
Indeed, in the large-perturbation regime, efficiently training certifiably secure systems remains an
important open question. We believe that conventional ‖·‖∞-defense heuristics developed for image
classification do not offer much comfort in the large-perturbation/perceptible-attack setting: ‖·‖∞-
attacks with a large budget can render images indiscernible to human eyes, while, for example,
‖·‖1-attacks allow a concerted perturbation to critical regions of the image. Certainly ‖·‖∞-attack
and defense models have been fruitful in building a foundation for security research in deep learning,
but moving beyond them may be necessary for more advances in the large-perturbation regime.
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A Additional Experiments
A.1 MNIST attacks
We repeat Figure 3 using FGM (tow row of Figure 6) and IFGM (bottom row of Figure 6) attacks.
The same trends are evident as in Figure 3.
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Figure 6. Further attacks on the MNIST dataset. We illustrate test misclassification error vs.
the adversarial perturbation level ǫadv. Top row: FGM attacks, bottom row: IFGM attacks. Left
column: Euclidean-norm attacks, right column: ∞-norm attacks. The vertical bar in (a) and (c)
indicates the perturbation level that was used for training the PGM, FGM, and IFGM models and
the estimated radius
√
ρ̂n(θWRM).
A.2 MNIST stability of loss surface
In Figure 7, we repeat the illustration in Figure 4(b) for more digits. WRM’s “misclassifications” are
consistently reasonable to the human eye, as gradient-based perturbations actually transform the
original image to other labels. Other models do not exhibit this behavior with the same consistency
(if at all). Reasonable misclassifications correspond to having learned a data representation that
makes gradients interpretable.
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Figure 7. Visualizing stability over inputs. We illustrate the smallest WRM perturbation (largest
γadv) necessary to make a model misclassify a datapoint.
A.3 MNIST Experiments with varied γ
In Figure 8, we choose a fixed WRM adversary (fixed γadv) and perturb WRM models trained with
various penalty parameters γ. As the bound (11) with η = γ suggests, even when the adversary
has more budget than that used for training (1/γ < 1/γadv), degradation in performance is still
smooth. Further, as we decrease the penalty γ, the amount of achieved robustness—measured here
by test error on adversarial perturbations with γadv—has diminishing gains; this is again consistent
with our theory which says that the inner problem (2b) is not efficiently computable for small γ.
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(b) Test error vs. 1/γ
Figure 8. (a) Stability and (b) test error for a fixed adversary. We train WRM models with various
levels of γ and perturb them with a fixed WRM adversary (γadv indicated by the vertical bar).
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A.4 MNIST experiments with a larger adversarial budget
Figures 9 and 10 repeat Figures 2(b), 3, and 6 for a larger training adversarial budget (γ = 0.02C2)
as well as larger test adversarial budgets. The distinctions in performance between various methods
are less apparent now. For our method, the inner supremum is no longer strongly concave for
over 10% of the data, indicating that we no longer have guarantees of performance. For large
adversaries (i.e. large desired robustness values) our approach becomes a heuristic just like the
other approaches.
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Figure 9. Empirical comparison between certificate of robustness (11) (blue) and out-of-sample
(test) worst-case performance (red) for the experiments on MNIST with a larger training adversary.
The statistical error term ǫn(t) is omitted from the certificate. The vertical bar indicates the achieved
level of robustness on the training set ρ̂n(θWRM).
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Figure 10. Attacks on the MNIST dataset with larger (training and test) adversarial budgets. We
illustrate test misclassification error vs. the adversarial perturbation level ǫadv. Top row: PGM at-
tacks, middle row: FGM attacks, bottom row: IFGM attacks. Left column: Euclidean-norm attacks,
right column: ∞-norm attacks. The vertical bar in (a), (c), and (e) indicates the perturbation level
that was used for training the PGM, FGM, and IFGM models and the estimated radius
√
ρ̂n(θWRM).
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A.5 MNIST ∞-norm experiments
We consider training FGM, IFGM, and PGM with p = ∞. We first compare with WRM trained
in the same manner as before—with the squared Euclidean cost. Then, we consider a heuristic
Lagrangian approach for training WRM with the squared ∞-norm cost.
A.5.1 Comparison with standard WRM
Our method (WRM) is trained to defend against ‖·‖2-norm attacks by using the cost function
c((x, y), (x0, y0)) = ‖x− x0‖22 +∞ · 1 {y 6= y0}
with the convention that 0 · ∞ = 0. Standard adversarial training methods often train to de-
fend against ‖·‖∞-norm attacks, which we compare our method against in this subsection. Direct
comparison between these approaches is not immediate, as we need to determine a suitable ǫ to
train FGM, IFGM, and PGM in the ∞-norm that corresponds to the penalty parameter γ for the
‖·‖2-norm that we use. Similar to the expression (19), we use
ǫ := E
P̂n
[‖T (θWRM, Z)− Z‖∞] (23)
as the adversarial training budget for FGM, IFGM and PGM with ‖·‖∞-norms. Because 2-norm
adversaries tend to focus budgets on a subset of features, the resulting ∞-norm perturbations are
relatively large. In Figure 11 we show the results trained with a small training adversarial budget.
In this regime, (large γ, small ǫ), WRM matches the performance of other techniques.
In Figure 12 we show the results trained with a large training adversarial budget. In this regime
(small γ, large ǫ), performance between WRM and other methods diverge. WRM, which provably
defends against small perturbations, outperforms other heuristics against imperceptible attacks for
both Euclidean and ∞ norms. Further, it outperforms other heuristics on natural images, showing
that it consistently achieves a smaller price of robustness. On attacks with large adversarial budgets
(large ǫadv), however, the performance of WRM is worse than that of the other methods (especially
in the case of ∞-norm attacks). These findings verify that WRM is a practical alternative over
existing heuristics for the moderate levels of robustness where our guarantees hold.
A.5.2 Comparison with ‖·‖∞-WRM
Our computational guarantees given in Theorem 2 does not hold anymore when we consider ∞-
norm adversaries:
c((x, y), (x0, y0)) = ‖x− x0‖2∞ +∞ · 1 {y 6= y0} . (24)
Optimizing the Lagrangian formulation (2b) with the∞-norm is difficult since subtracting a multi-
ple of the∞-norm does not add (negative) curvature in all directions. In Appendix E, we propose a
heuristic algorithm for solving the inner supremum problem (2b) with the above cost function (24).
Our approach is based on a variant of proximal algorithms.
We compare our proximal heuristic introduced in Appendix E with other adversarial training
procedures that were trained against ∞-norm adversaries. Results are shown in Figure 13 for a
small training adversary and Figure 14 for a large training adversary. We observe that similar
trends as in Section A.5.1 hold again.
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Figure 11. Attacks on the MNIST dataset. We compare standard WRM with∞-norm PGM, FGM,
IFGM. We illustrate test misclassification error vs. the adversarial perturbation level ǫadv. Top row:
PGM attacks, middle row: FGM attacks, bottom row: IFGM attacks. Left column: Euclidean-norm
attacks, right column: ∞-norm attacks. The vertical bar in (a), (c), and (e) indicates the estimated
radius
√
ρ̂n(θWRM). The vertical bar in (b), (d), and (f) indicates the perturbation level that was
used for training the PGM, FGM, and IFGM models via (23).
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Figure 12. Attacks on the MNIST dataset with larger (training and test) adversarial budgets. We
compare standard WRM with ∞-norm PGM, FGM, IFGM models. We illustrate test misclassifi-
cation error vs. the adversarial perturbation level ǫadv. Top row: PGM attacks, middle row: FGM
attacks, bottom row: IFGM attacks. Left column: Euclidean-norm attacks, right column: ∞-norm
attacks. The vertical bar in (a), (c), and (e) indicates the estimated radius
√
ρ̂n(θWRM). The vertical
bar in (b), (d), and (f) indicates the perturbation level that was used for training the PGM, FGM,
and IFGM models via (23).
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Figure 13. Attacks on the MNIST dataset. All models are trained in the ∞-norm. We illustrate
test misclassification error vs. the adversarial perturbation level ǫadv. Top row: PGM attacks, middle
row: FGM attacks, bottom row: IFGM attacks. Left column: Euclidean-norm attacks, right column:
∞-norm attacks. The vertical bar in (b), (d), and (f) indicates the perturbation level that was used
for training the PGM, FGM, and IFGM models and the estimated radius
√
ρ̂n(θWRM).
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Figure 14. Attacks on the MNIST dataset with larger (training and test) adversarial budgets.
All models are trained in the ∞-norm. We illustrate test misclassification error vs. the adversarial
perturbation level ǫadv. Top row: PGM attacks, middle row: FGM attacks, bottom row: IFGM
attacks. Left column: Euclidean-norm attacks, right column: ∞-norm attacks. The vertical bar in
(b), (d), and (f) indicates the perturbation level that was used for training the PGM, FGM, and
IFGM models and the estimated radius
√
ρ̂n(θWRM).
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B Finding worst-case perturbations with ReLU’s is NP-hard
We show that computing worst-case perturbations supu∈U ℓ(θ; z + u) is NP-hard for a large class
of feedforward neural networks with ReLU activations. This result is essentially due to Katz et al.
[28]. In the following, we use polynomial time to mean polynomial growth with respect to m, the
dimension of the inputs z.
An optimization problem is NPO (NP-Optimization) if (i) the dimensionality of the solution
grows polynomially, (ii) the language {u ∈ U} can be recognized in polynomial time (i.e. a de-
terministic algorithm can decide in polynomial time whether u ∈ U), and (iii) ℓ can be evaluated
in polynomial time. We restrict analysis to feedforward neural networks with ReLU activations
such that the corresponding worst-case perturbation problem is NPO.4 Furthermore, we impose
separable structure on U , that is, U := {v ≤ u ≤ w} for some v < w ∈ Rm.
Lemma 2. Consider feedforward neural networks with ReLU’s and let U := {v ≤ u ≤ w}, where
v < w such that the optimization problem maxu∈U ℓ(θ; z+u) is NPO. Then there exists θ such that
this optimization problem is also NP-hard.
Proof First, we introduce the decision reformulation of the problem: for some b, we ask whether
there exists some u such that ℓ(θ; z + u) ≥ b. The decision reformulation for an NPO problem is
in NP, as a certificate for the decision problem can be verified in polynomial time. By appropriate
scaling of θ, v, and w, Katz et al. [28] show that 3-SAT Turing-reduces to this decision problem:
given an oracle D for the decision problem, we can solve an arbitrary instance of 3-SAT with a
polynomial number of calls to D. The decision problem is thus NP-complete.
Now, consider an oracle O for the optimization problem. The decision problem Turing-reduces
to the optimization problem, as the decision problem can be solved with one call to O. Thus, the
optimization problem is NP-hard.
C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
For completeness, we provide an alternative proof to that given in Blanchet and Murthy [8] using
convex analysis. Our proof is less general, requiring the cost function c to be continuous and convex
in its first argument. The below general duality result gives Proposition 1 as an immediate special
case. Recalling Rockafellar and Wets [49, Def. 14.27 and Prop. 14.33], we say that a function
g : X × Z → R is a normal integrand if for each α, the mapping
z 7→ {x | g(x, z) ≤ α}
is closed-valued and measurable. We recall that if g is continuous, then g is a normal integrand [49,
Cor. 14.34]; therefore, g(x, z) = γc(x, z) − ℓ(θ;x) is a normal integrand. We have the following
theorem.
Theorem 5. Let f, c be such that for any γ ≥ 0, the function g(x, z) = γc(x, z)− f(x) is a normal
integrand. (For example, continuity of f and closed convexity of c is sufficient.) For any ρ > 0 we
4Note that z, u ∈ Rm, so trivially the dimensionality of the solution grows polynomially.
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have
sup
P :Wc(P,Q)
∫
f(x)dP (x) = inf
γ≥0
{∫
sup
x∈X
{f(x)− γc(x, z)} dQ(z) + γρ
}
.
Proof First, the mapping P 7→ Wc(P,Q) is convex in the space of probability measures. As
taking P = Q yields Wc(Q,Q) = 0, Slater’s condition holds and we may apply standard (infinite
dimensional) duality results [34, Thm. 8.7.1] to obtain
sup
P :Wc(P,Q)
∫
f(x)dP (x) = sup
P :Wc(P,Q)
inf
γ≥0
{∫
f(x)dP (x)− γWc(P,Q) + γρ
}
= inf
γ≥0
sup
P :Wc(P,Q)
{∫
f(x)dP (x)− γWc(P,Q) + γρ
}
.
Now, noting that for any M ∈ Π(P,Q) we have ∫ fdP = ∫∫ f(x)dM(x, z), we have that the
rightmost quantity in the preceding display satisfies∫
f(x)dP (x)− γ inf
M∈Π(P,Q)
∫
c(x, z)dM(x, z) = sup
M∈Π(P,Q)
{∫
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dM(x, z)
}
.
That is, we have
sup
P :Wc(P,Q)
∫
f(x)dP (x) = inf
γ≥0
sup
P,M∈Π(P,Q)
{∫
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dM(x, z) + γρ
}
. (25)
Now, we note a few basic facts. First, because we have a joint supremum over P and measures
M ∈ Π(P,Q) in expression (25), we have that
sup
P,M∈Π(P,Q)
∫
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dM(x, z) ≤
∫
sup
x
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dQ(z).
We would like to show equality in the above. To that end, we note that if P denotes the space of
regular conditional probabilities (Markov kernels) from Z to X, then
sup
P,M∈Π(P,Q)
∫
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dM(x, z) ≥ sup
P∈P
∫
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dP (x | z)dQ(z).
Recall that a conditional distribution P (· | z) is regular if P (· | z) is a distribution for each z
and for each measurable A, the function z 7→ P (A | z) is measurable. Let X denote the space
of all measurable mappings z 7→ x(z) from Z to X. Using the powerful measurability results of
Rockafellar and Wets [49, Theorem 14.60], we have
sup
x∈X
∫
[f(x(z)) − γc(x(z), z)]dQ(z) =
∫
sup
x∈X
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dQ(z)
because f − c is upper semi-continuous, and the latter function is measurable. Now, let x(z) be
any measurable function that is ǫ-close to attaining the supremum above. Define the conditional
distribution P (· | z) to be supported on x(z), which is evidently measurable. Then using the
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preceding display, we have∫
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dP (x | z)dQ(z) =
∫
[f(x(z))− γc(x(z), z)]dQ(z)
≥
∫
sup
x∈X
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dQ(z) − ǫ
≥ sup
P,M∈Π(P,Q)
∫
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dM(x, z) − ǫ.
As ǫ > 0 is arbitrary, this gives
sup
P,M∈Π(P,Q)
∫
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dM(x, z) =
∫
sup
x∈X
[f(x)− γc(x, z)]dQ(z)
as desired, which implies both equality (6) and completes the proof.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
First, note that z⋆(θ) is unique and well-defined by the strong convexity of f(θ, ·). For Lipschitzness
of z⋆(θ), we first argue that z⋆(θ) is continuous in θ. For any θ, optimality of z⋆(θ) implies that
gz(θ, z
⋆(θ))T (z − z⋆(θ)) ≤ 0. By strong concavity, for any θ1, θ2 and z⋆1 = z⋆(θ1) and z⋆2 = z⋆(θ2),
we have
λ
2
‖z⋆1 − z⋆2‖2 ≤ f(θ2, z⋆2)−f(θ2, z⋆1) and f(θ2, z⋆2) ≤ f(θ2, z⋆1)+gz(θ2, z⋆1)T (z⋆2−z⋆1)−
λ
2
‖z⋆1 − z⋆2‖2 .
Summing these inequalities gives
λ ‖z⋆1 − z⋆2‖2 ≤ gz(θ2, z⋆1)T (z⋆2 − z⋆1) ≤ (gz(θ2, z⋆1)− gz(θ1, z⋆1))T (z⋆2 − z⋆1),
where the last inequality follows because gz(θ1, z
⋆
1)
T (z⋆2−z⋆1) ≤ 0. Using a cross-Lipschitz condition
from above and Holder’s inequality, we obtain
λ ‖z⋆1 − z⋆2‖2 ≤ ‖gz(θ2, z⋆1)− gz(θ1, z⋆1)‖⋆ ‖z⋆1 − z⋆2‖ ≤ Lzθ ‖θ1 − θ2‖ ‖z⋆1 − z⋆2‖ ,
that is,
‖z⋆1 − z⋆2‖ ≤
Lzθ
λ
‖θ1 − θ2‖ . (26)
To see the second inequality, we show that f¯ is differentiable with ∇f¯(θ) = gθ(θ, z⋆(θ)). By
using a variant of the envelope (or Danskin’s) theorem, we first show directional differentiability
of f¯ . Recall that we say f is inf-compact if for all θ0 ∈ Θ, there exists α > 0 and a compact set
C ⊂ Θ such that
∅ 6= {z ∈ Z : f(θ, z) ≤ α} ⊂ C
for all θ in some neighborhood of θ0 [10]. See Bonnans and Shapiro [10, Theorem 4.13] for a proof
of the following result.
Lemma 3. Suppose that f(·, z) is differentiable in θ for all z ∈ Z, and f , ∇zf are continuous on
Θ×Z. If f is inf-compact, then f¯ is directionally differentiable with
f¯ ′(θ, d) = sup
z∈S(θ)
∇zf(θ, z)⊤d
where S(θ) = argminz f(θ, z).
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Now, note that from Assumption B, we have
|f(θ, z)− f(θ0, z)−∇θf(θ0, z)⊤(θ − θ0)| ≤ Lθθ ‖θ − θ0‖
from which it is easy to see that f is inf-compact. Applying Lemma 3 to f¯ and noting that
S(θ) is unique by strong convexity of f(θ, ·), we have that f¯ is directionally differentiable with
∇f¯(θ) = gθ(θ, z⋆(θ)). Since gθ is continuous by Assumption B and z⋆(θ) is Lipschitz (26), we
conclude that f¯ is differentiable.
Finally, we have
‖gθ(θ1, z⋆1)− gθ(θ2, z⋆2)‖⋆ ≤ ‖gθ(θ1, z⋆1)− gθ(θ1, z⋆2)‖⋆ + ‖gθ(θ1, z⋆2)− gθ(θ2, z⋆2)‖⋆
≤ Lθz ‖z⋆1 − z⋆2‖+ Lθθ ‖θ1 − θ2‖
≤
(
Lθθ +
LθzLzθ
λ
)
‖θ1 − θ2‖ ,
where we have used inequality (26) again. This is the desired result.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Our proof is based on that of Ghadimi and Lan [22].
For shorthand, let f(θ, z; z0) = ℓ(θ; z)− γc(z, z0), noting that we perform gradient steps with
gt = ∇θf(θt, ẑ(θt; zt); zt)
for ẑt an ǫ-approximate maximizer of f(θ, z; zt) in z, and θt+1 = θt − αtgt. By a Taylor expansion
using the Lφ-smoothness of the objective F , we have
F (θt+1) ≤ F (θt) + 〈∇F (θt), θt+1 − θt〉+ Lφ
2
∥∥θt+1 − θt∥∥2
2
= F (θt)− αt
∥∥∇F (θt)∥∥2
2
+
Lφα
2
t
2
∥∥gt∥∥2
2
+ αt
〈∇F (θt),∇F (θt)− gt〉
= F (θt)− αt
(
1− Lφαt
2
)∥∥∇F (θt)∥∥2
2
(27)
+ αt
(
1 +
Lφαt
2
)〈∇F (θt),∇F (θt)− gt〉+ Lφα2t
2
∥∥gt −∇F (θt)∥∥2
2
.
Recalling the definition (2b) of φγ(θ; z0) = supz∈Z f(θ, z; z0), we define the potentially biased errors
δt = gt −∇θφγ(θt; zt). Letting zt⋆ = argmaxz f(θt, z; zt), these errors evidently satisfy∥∥δt∥∥2
2
=
∥∥∇θφγ(θt; zt)−∇θf(θ, ẑt; zt)∥∥22 = ∥∥∇θℓ(θ, zt⋆)−∇θℓ(θ, ẑt)∥∥22
≤ L2θz‖ẑt − zt⋆‖22 ≤
L2θz
λ
ǫ,
where the final inequality uses the λ = γ − Lzz strong-concavity of z 7→ f(θ, z; z0). For shorthand,
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let ǫ̂ =
2L2θz
γ−Lzz
ǫ. Substituting the preceding display into the progress guarantee (27), we have
F (θt+1) = F (θt)− αt
(
1− Lφαt
2
)∥∥∇F (θt)∥∥2
2
− αt
(
1 +
Lφαt
2
)〈∇F (θt), δt〉
+ αt
(
1 +
Lφαt
2
)〈∇F (θt),∇F (θt)−∇θφγ(θ; zt)〉+ Lφα2t
2
∥∥∇θφγ(θ; zt) + δt −∇F (θt)∥∥22
≤ F (θt)− αt
2
(1− Lφαt)
∥∥∇F (θt)∥∥2
2
+
αt
2
(
1 +
Lφαt
2
)∥∥δt∥∥2
2
αt
(
1 +
Lφαt
2
)〈∇F (θt),∇F (θt)−∇θφγ(θ; zt)〉+ Lφα2t (∥∥∇θφγ(θt; zt)−∇F (θt)∥∥22 + ∥∥δt∥∥22).
Noting that E[∇θφγ(θt; zt) | θt] = ∇F (θt), we take expectations to find
E[F (θt+1)− F (θt) | θt] ≤ −αt
2
(1− Lφαt)
∥∥∇F (θt)∥∥2
2
+
(
αt
2
+
5Lφα
2
t
4
)
ǫ̂+ Lφα
2
tσ
2, (28)
where we have used that E[‖∇φγ(θ;Z)−∇F (θ)‖22] ≤ σ2 by assumption.
The bound (28) gives the theorem essentially immediately for fixed stepsizes α, as we have
α
2
(1− Lφα)E
[ T∑
t=1
∥∥∇F (θt)∥∥2
2
]
≤ F (θ0)− E[F (θT+1)] + Tα
2
(
1 +
5Lφα
4
)
ǫ̂+ TLφα
2σ2.
Noting that infθ F (θ) ≤ F (θT+1) gives the final result.
C.4 Proof of Theorem 3
We first show the bound (11). From the duality result (5), we have the deterministic result that
sup
P :Wc(P,Q)≤ρ
EQ[ℓ(θ;Z)] ≤ γρ+ EQ[φγ(θ;Z)]
for all ρ > 0, distributions Q, and γ ≥ 0. Next, we show that E
P̂n
[φγ(θ;Z)] concentrates around
its population counterpart at the usual rate [11].
First, we have that
φγ(θ; z) ∈ [−Mℓ,Mℓ],
because −Mℓ ≤ ℓ(θ; z) ≤ φγ(θ; z) ≤ supz ℓ(θ; z) ≤ Mℓ. Thus, the functional θ 7→ Fn(θ) satisfies
bounded differences [12, Thm. 6.2], and applying standard results on Rademacher complexity [1]
and entropy integrals [55, Ch. 2.2] gives the result.
To see the second result (12), we substitute ρ = ρ̂n in the bound (11). Then, with probability
at least 1− e−t, we have
sup
P :Wc(P,P0)≤ρ̂n(θ)
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] ≤ γρ̂n(θ) + EP̂n [φγ(θ;Z)] + ǫn(t).
Since we have
sup
P :Wc(P,P̂n)≤ρ̂n(θ)
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)] = EP̂n [φγ(θ;Z)] + γρ̂n(θ).
from the strong duality in Proposition 1, our second result follows.
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C.5 Proof of Corollary 1
The result is essentially standard [55], which we now give for completeness. Note that for F =
{ℓ(θ; ·) : θ ∈ Θ}, any (ǫ, ‖·‖)-covering {θ1, . . . , θN} of Θ guarantees that mini |ℓ(θ; z)− ℓ(θi; z)| ≤ Lǫ
for all θ, z, or
N(F , ǫ, ‖·‖L∞(Z)) ≤ N(Θ, ǫ/L, ‖·‖) ≤
(
1 +
diam(Θ)L
ǫ
)d
,
where diam(Θ) = supθ,θ′∈Θ ‖θ − θ′‖. Noting that |ℓ(θ;Z)| ≤ L diam(Θ) +M0 =: Mℓ, we have the
result.
C.6 Proof of Theorem 4
Define
P ∗n(θ) := argmax
P
{
EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(P, P̂n)
}
,
P ∗(θ) := argmax
P
{EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(P,P0)} .
First, we show that P ∗(θ) and P ∗n(θ) are attained for all θ ∈ Θ. We omit the dependency on θ for
notational simplicity and only show the result for P ∗(θ) as the case for P ∗n(θ) is symmetric. Let P
ǫ
be an ǫ-maximizer, so that
EP ǫ [ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(P ǫ, P0) ≥ sup
P
{EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(Pn, P0)} − ǫ.
As Z is compact, the collection {P 1/k}k∈N is a uniformly tight collection of measures. By Prohorov’s
theorem [7, Ch 1.1, p. 57], (restricting to a subsequence if necessary), there exists some distribution
P ∗ on Z such that P 1/k d→ P ∗ as k → ∞. Continuity properties of Wasserstein distances [56,
Corollary 6.11] then imply that
lim
k→∞
Wc(P
1/k, P0) =Wc(P
∗, P0). (29)
Combining (29) and the monotone convergence theorem, we obtain
EP ∗[ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(P ∗, P0) = lim
k→∞
{
EP 1/k [ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(P 1/k, P0)
}
≥ sup
P
{EP [ℓ(θ;Z)]− γWc(P,P0)} .
We conclude that P ∗ is attained for all P0.
Next, we show the concentration result (30). Recall the definition (9) of the transportation
mapping
T (θ, z) := argmax
z′∈Z
{
ℓ(θ; z′)− γc(z′, z)} ,
which is unique and well-defined under our strong concavity assumption that γ > Lzz, and smooth
(recall Eq. (16)) in θ. Then by Proposition 1 (or by using a variant of Kantorovich duality [56,
Chs. 9–10]), we have
EP ∗n(θ)
[ℓ(θ;Z) = EP̂n [ℓ(θ;T (θ;Z))] and EP ∗(θ)[ℓ(θ;Z) = EP0 [ℓ(θ;T (θ;Z))]
Wc(P
∗
n(θ), P̂n) = EP̂n [c(T (θ;Z), Z)] and Wc(P
∗(θ), P0) = EP0 [c(T (θ;Z), Z)].
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We now proceed by showing the uniform convergence of
E
P̂n
[c(T (θ;Z), Z)] to EP0 [c(T (θ;Z), Z)]
under both cases (i), that c is Lipschitz, and (ii), that ℓ is Lipschitz in z, using a covering argument
on Θ. Recall inequality (16) (i.e. Lemma 1), which is that
‖T (θ1; z)− T (θ2; z)‖ ≤ Lzθ
[γ − Lzz]+
‖θ1 − θ2‖ .
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Assume the conditions of Theorem 4. Then for any θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ,
|c(T (θ1; z), z) − c(T (θ2; z), z)| ≤ LcLzθ
[γ − Lzz]+
‖θ1 − θ2‖ .
Proof In the first case, that c is Lc-Lipschitz in its first argument, this is trivial: we have
|c(T (θ1; z), z) − c(T (θ2; z), z)| ≤ Lc ‖T (θ1; z)− T (θ2; z)‖ ≤ LcLzθ
[γ − Lzz]+
‖θ1 − θ2‖
by the smoothness inequality (16) for T .
In the second case, that z 7→ ℓ(θ, z) is Lc-Lipschitz, let zi = T (θi; z) for shorthand. Then we
have
γc(z2, z)− γc(z1, z) = γc(z2, z)− ℓ(θ2, z2) + ℓ(θ2, z2)− γc(z1, z)
≤ γc(z1, z)− ℓ(θ2, z1) + ℓ(θ2, z2)− γc(z1, z) = ℓ(θ2, z2)− ℓ(θ2, z1),
and similarly,
γc(z2, z)− γc(z1, z) = γc(z2, z)− ℓ(θ1, z1) + ℓ(θ1, z1)− γc(z1, z)
≥ γc(z2, z)− ℓ(θ1, z1) + ℓ(θ1, z2)− γc(z2, z) = ℓ(θ1, z2)− ℓ(θ1, z1).
Combining these two inequalities and using that
|ℓ(θ, z2)− ℓ(θ, z1)| ≤ γLc ‖z2 − z1‖
for any θ gives the result.
Using Lemma 4 we obtain that θ 7→ |E
P̂n
[c(T (θ;Z), θ)]−EP0 [c(T (θ;Z), Z)]| is 2LcLzθ/ [γ − Lzz]+-
Lipschitz. Let Θcover = {θ1, · · · , θN} be a [γ−Lzz]+t4LcLzθ -cover of Θ with respect to ‖·‖. From Lipschitz-
ness of |EP̂n [c(T (θ;Z), Z)]− EP0 [c(T (θ;Z), Z)]|, we have that if for all θ ∈ {Θcover},
|E
P̂n
[c(T (θ;Z), Z)]− EP0 [c(T (θ;Z), θ)]| ≤
t
2
,
then it follows that
sup
θ∈Θ
|EP̂n [c(T (θ;Z), Z)]− EP0 [c(T (θ;Z), Z)]| ≤ t.
Under the first assumption (i), we have |c(T (θ;Z), Z)| ≤ 2LcMz. Applying Hoeffding’s inequal-
ity, for any fixed θ ∈ Θ
P
(
|E
P̂n
[c(T (θ;Z), Z)]− EP0 [c(T (θ;Z), Z)]| ≥
t
2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− nt
2
32L2
c
M2
z
)
.
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Taking a union bound over θ1, · · · , θN , we conclude that
P
(
sup
θ∈Θ
|E
P̂n
[c(T (θ;Z), Z)]− EP0 [c(T (θ;Z), Z)]| ≥ t
)
≤ 2N
(
Θ,
[γ − Lzz]+ t
4LcLzθ
, ‖·‖
)
exp
(
− nt
2
32L2
c
M2
z
)
which was our desired result (30).
Under the second assumption (ii), we have from the definition of the transport map T
γc(T (θ; z), z) ≤ ℓ(θ; z) ≤Mℓ
and hence |c(T (θ;Z), Z)| ≤Mℓ/γ. The result for the second case follows from an identical reasoning.
D Supervised Learning
In supervised learning settings, it is often natural—for example, in classification—to only consider
adversarial perturbations to the feature vectors (covariates). In this section, we give an adapation of
the results in Sections 2 and 3 (Theorems 2 and 4) to such scenarios. Let Z = (X,Y ) ∈ X×R where
X ∈ X is a feature vector5 and Y ∈ R is a label. In classification settings, we have Y ∈ {1, . . . ,K}.
We consider an adversary that can only perturb the feature vector X [24], which can be easily
represented in our robust formulation (2) by defining the cost function c : Z × Z → R+ ∪ {∞} as
follows: for z = (x, y) and z′ = (x′, y′), recall the covariate shift cost function (8)
c(z, z′) := cx(x, x
′) +∞ · 1{y 6= y′} ,
where cx : X ×X → R+ is the transportation cost for the feature vector X. As before, we assume
that cx is nonnegative, continuous, convex in its first argument and satisfies cx(x, x) = 0.
Under the cost function (8), the robust surrogate loss in the penalty problem (2) and its empirical
counterpart (7) becomes
φγ(θ; (x0, y0)) = sup
x∈X
{ℓ(θ; (x, y0))− γcx(x, x0)} .
Similarly as in Section 2.1, we require the following two assumptions that guarantee efficient com-
putability of the robust surrogate φγ .
Assumption C. The function cx : X × X → R+ is continuous. For each x0 ∈ X , cx(·, x0) is
1-strongly convex with respect to the norm ‖·‖.
Let ‖·‖∗ be the dual norm to ‖·‖; we again abuse notation by using the same norm ‖·‖ on Θ and
X , though the specific norm is clear from context.
Assumption D. The loss ℓ : Θ×Z → R satisfies the Lipschitzian smoothness conditions∥∥∇θℓ(θ; (x, y)) −∇θℓ(θ′; (x, y))∥∥∗ ≤ Lθθ ∥∥θ − θ′∥∥ , ∥∥∇xℓ(θ; (x, y)) −∇xℓ(θ; (x′, y))∥∥∗ ≤ Lxx ∥∥x− x′∥∥ ,∥∥∇θℓ(θ; (x, y)) −∇θℓ(θ; (x′, y))∥∥∗ ≤ Lθx ∥∥x− x′∥∥ , ∥∥∇xℓ(θ; (x, y)) −∇xℓ(θ′; (x, y))∥∥∗ ≤ Lxθ ∥∥θ − θ′∥∥ .
Under Assumptions C and D, an analogue of Lemma 1 still holds. The proof of the following
result is nearly identical to that of Lemma 1; we state the full result for completeness.
5We assume that X is a subset of normed vector space.
37
Lemma 5. Let f : Θ × X → R be differentiable and λ-strongly concave in x with respect to the
norm ‖·‖, and define f¯(θ) = supx∈X f(θ, x). Let gθ(θ, x) = ∇θf(θ, x) and gx(θ, x) = ∇xf(θ, x),
and assume gθ and gx satisfy the Lipschitz conditions of Assumption B. Then f¯ is differentiable,
and letting x⋆(θ) = argmaxx∈X f(θ, x), we have ∇f¯(θ) = gθ(θ, x⋆(θ)). Moreover,
‖x⋆(θ1)− x⋆(θ2)‖ ≤ Lxθ
λ
‖θ1 − θ2‖ and
∥∥∇f¯(θ)−∇f¯(θ′)∥∥
⋆
≤
(
Lθθ +
LθxLxθ
λ
)∥∥θ − θ′∥∥ .
From Lemma 5, our previous results (Theorems 2 and 4) follow. The following is an analogue
of Theorem 2 for the cost function (8).
Theorem 6 (Convergence of Nonconvex SGD). Let Assumptions C and D hold with the ℓ2-norm
and let Θ = Rd. Let ∆F ≥ F (θ0) − infθ F (θ). Assume E[‖∇F (θ)−∇θφγ(θ, Z)‖22] ≤ σ2, and take
constant stepsizes α =
√
2∆F
Lσ2T where L = Lθθ +
LθxLxθ
γ−Lxx
. Then Algorithm 1 satisfies
1
T
T∑
t=1
E
[∥∥∇F (θt)∥∥2
2
]
− 2L
2
θx
γ − Lxx ǫ ≤ σ
√
8
L∆F
T
.
Similarly, an analogous result to Theorem 4 holds. Define the transport map for the covariate shift
Tγ(θ; (x0, y0)) := argmax
x∈X
{ℓ(θ; (x, y0))− γcx(x, x0)}.
Theorem 7. Let Z ⊂ {z ∈ Rm : ‖z‖ ≤ Mz} so that ‖Z‖ ≤ Mz almost surely and assume either
that (i) cx(·, ·) is Lc-Lipschitz over X with respect to the norm ‖·‖ in each argument, or (ii) that
ℓ(θ, z) ∈ [0,Mℓ] and x 7→ ℓ(θ, (x, y)) is γLc-Lipschitz for all θ ∈ Θ. If Assumptions C and D hold,
then with probability at least 1− e−t,
sup
θ∈Θ
|E
P̂n
[c(Tγ(θ;Z), Z)]− EP0 [c(Tγ(θ;Z), Z)]| ≤ 4D
√
1
n
(
t+ logN
(
Θ,
[γ − Lxx]+ t
4LcLxθ
, ‖·‖
))
. (30)
where B = LcMz under assumption (i) and B =Mℓ/γ under assumption (ii).
For both results, the proofs are essentially identical as before, but with an application of Lemma 5
instead of Lemma 1.
E Proximal algorithm for ‖·‖∞-norm robustness
In this section, we give a efficient training algorithm that learns to defend against ‖·‖∞-norm
perturbations. For simplicity, we assume Z = Rm for the rest of this section. Let θ ∈ Θ be some
fixed model, z0 ∈ Z a natural example6 and define f(z) := ℓ(θ; z) to ease notation. Concretely, we
are interested in solving the optimization problem
maximize
z
f(z)− α
2
∥∥z − z0∥∥2
∞
Note that this is equivalent to computing the surrogate loss φγ(θ; z
0) = supz∈Z{ℓ(θ; z)− γc(z, z0)}
for c(z, z0) =
∥∥z − z0∥∥2
∞
and α = 2γ. Our following treatment can easily be modified for the
6We depart from our convention of denoting original datapoints as z0 to ease forthcoming notation.
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supervised learning scenario c((x, y), (x0, y0)) =
∥∥x− x0∥∥2
∞
+∞ · 1{y = y0} with the convention
that ∞ · 0 = 0. To make our notation consistent with the optimization literature, we consider the
minimization problem
minimize
z
−f(z) + α
2
∥∥z − z0∥∥2
∞
. (31)
A simple gradient descent algorithm applied to the problem (31) may be slow to converge in
practice. Intuitively, this is because the subgradient of z 7→ 12
∥∥z − z0∥∥2
∞
is given by
∥∥z − z0∥∥
∞
· s
where s is a m-dimensional vector taking values in [−1, 1] whose coordinates are non-zero only
when |zj − z0,j | =
∥∥z − z0∥∥
∞
. Hence, at any given iteration of gradient descent, the ‖·‖∞-norm
penalty term only gets accounted for by at most a few coordinates.
To remedy this issue, we consider a proximal algorithm for solving the problem (31) (see, for
example, Parikh and Boyd [46] for an comprehensive review of proximal algorithms). For a function
g : Z → R and a positive number λ > 0, the proximal operator for λg is defined by
proxλg(v) := argmin
z
{
g(z) +
1
2λ
‖z − v‖22
}
.
Then, the proximal algorithm on the problem (31) consists of two steps at each iteration t: (i) for
the smooth function −f(z), take a gradient descent step at the current iterate zt (zt+ 12 below) and
(ii) for the non-smooth function
∥∥z − z0∥∥2
∞
, take a proximal step for the function λ
tα
2
∥∥· − z0∥∥2
∞
at
zt+
1
2 (zt+1 below):
zt+
1
2 = zt + λt∇f(zt), zt+1 = proxλtα
2
‖·−z0‖2
∞
(
zt+
1
2
)
. (32)
The following proposition shows that we can compute the proximal step zt+1 efficiently, simply by
sorting the vector |zt+ 12 − z0|. We denote by vt, the sorted vector of |zt+ 12 − z0| in decreasing
order. In the proposition, we use the notation [·]+ = max(·, 0).
Proposition 8. Define the scale parameter βt > 0 by
βt :=
1
1 + αλtjt
jt∑
i=1
vti where j
t := max
{
j ∈ [m] :
j−1∑
i=1
vi −
(
1
αλt
+ (j − 1)
)
vj < 0
}
. (33)
Then, zt+1 in the proximal update (32) is given by
zt+1 = zt+
1
2 −
[
|zt+ 12 − z0| − βt
]
+
sign
(
zt+
1
2 − z0
)
. (34)
See Section E.1 for the proof of the proposition. From the proposition, we obtain the proximal
procedure in Algorithm 2 that can be used to solve for the approximate maximizer of ℓ(θ; z) −
γc(z, z0) in Algorithm 1. Heuristically, ignoring the truncation term in the proximal update (34),
we have
zt+1 ≈ z0 + βt sign(zt + λt∇f(zt)− z0).
Here, we move towards the sign of zt + λt∇f(zt) − z0 modulated by the term βt, as opposed to
just the sign of ∇f(zt) for the iterated fast sign gradient method [24, 31].
E.1 Proof of Proposition 8
In this proof, we drop the subscript on the iteration t to ease notation. We assume without loss
of generality that zt+
1
2 − z0 6= 0. For some convex, lower semi-continuous function g : Rm → R,
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Algorithm 2 Proximal Algorithm for Maximizing f(z)− α2
∥∥z − z0∥∥2
∞
Input: Stepsizes λt
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1 do
zt+
1
2 ← zt + λt∇f(zt)
vt ← sort(|zt+ 12 − z0|,dec)
Compute βt as in (33)
zt+1 ← zt+ 12 −
[
|zt+ 12 − z0| − βt
]
+
sign
(
zt+
1
2 − z0
)
let g∗(s) = sups{s⊤t − g(t)} be the Fenchel conjuagte of g. From the Moreau decomposition [46,
Section 2.5], we have
proxg(w) + proxg∗(w) = w
for any w ∈ Rm. Noting that the conjugate of z 7→ αλ2 ‖z − z0‖2∞ is given by z 7→ z⊤z0 + 12αλ ‖z‖21,
we have
proxαλ
2
‖·−z0‖
2
∞
(w) = w − prox〈z0,·〉+ 1
2αλ
‖·‖21
(w) = w − prox 1
2αλ
‖·‖21
(w − z0)
Let us denote the sorted vector (in decreasing order) of |w−z0| by v. Then, in light of the preceeding
display, it suffices to show that
prox 1
2αλ
‖·‖21
(w − z0) = [|w − z| − β⋆]+ sign
(
w − z0) (35)
where β⋆ is defined as in (33). To show that equality (35) holds, note that the first order optimality
conditions for
prox 1
2αλ
‖·‖21
(w − z0) = argmin
z
{
1
2
‖z‖21 +
αλ
2
∥∥z − (w − z0)∥∥2
2
}
is given by
‖z‖1 sign(zi) + αλ(zi − wi + z0i ) = 0 if |zi| 6= 0 (36a)
‖z‖1 [−1, 1]− αλ(wi − z0i ) ∋ 0 if |zi| = 0. (36b)
Now, we use the following elementary lemma.
Lemma 6. For 0 6= v ≥ 0 with decreasing coordinates, the solution to the equation∑
i:vi>β
(vi − β) = αλβ
exists and is given by
β⋆ :=
1
1 + αλj⋆
j∑
i=1
vi where j
⋆ := max
{
j ∈ [m] :
j−1∑
i=1
vi −
(
1
αλ
+ (j − 1)
)
vj < 0
}
.
Proof of Lemma First, note that β 7→ ∑i:vi>β(vi − β) − αλβ =: h(β) is decreasing. Noting
that ‖v‖1 > 0 and −αλ ‖v‖∞ < 0, there exists β′ such that h(β′) = 0 and β′ ∈ (0, ‖v‖∞). Since
vi’s are decreasing and nonnegative, there exists j
′ such that vj′ > β
′ ≥ vj′+1 (we abuse notation
and let vm+1 := 0). Then, we have
j′−1∑
i=1
(vi − vj′)− αλvj′ < 0 ≤
j′∑
i=1
(vi − vj′+1)− αλvj′+1.
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That is, j′ = j⋆. Solving for β′ in
0 = h(β′) =
j⋆∑
i=1
vi − (αλ+ j⋆)β′,
we obtain β′ = β⋆ as claimed.
Now, define
z⋆ =
[|w − z0| − β⋆]
+
sign
(
w − z0) .
Then, we have from Lemma 6 that
‖z⋆‖1 =
∑
i:|wi−z0i |>β
⋆
(|wi − z0i | − β⋆) =
j⋆∑
i=1
(vi − β⋆) = αλβ⋆.
If z⋆i > 0, then sign(z
⋆
i ) = sign(wi − z0i ) so that
‖z⋆‖1 sign(zi) + αλ(z⋆i −wi + z0i ) = 0.
If z⋆i = 0, then |wi − z0i | ≤ β⋆ and
‖z⋆‖1 [−1, 1]− αλ(wi − z0i ) = αλβ⋆[−1, 1] − αλ(wi − z0i ) ∋ 0.
Hence, z⋆ satisfies the optimality condition (36) as desired.
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